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BOOK REVIEWS
DISCOVERY IN VIRGINIA. W. Hamilton Bryson. Charlottesville: The Michie
Company. 1978. pp. 251. $25.00.
Reviewed by Edward S. Graves*
The publication of the new book by Professor Bryson, enlarging and
taking the place of his previous study of some discovery devices, is in order
because of wide current dissatisfaction with abuses of discovery and also
because of recent changes made in the Virginia rules and statutes as a
part of the revision of Title 8 of the Code.
In connection with the first it is well to be reminded, as Professor Bryson
does by recurrent references to historic equity practices predating the mod-
ern rules, that the value of obtaining advance information from other
parties to a lawsuit has been recognized for many years, long before the
promulgation of the federal discovery rules in 1938. That discovery prac-
tices have formed a part of our historic procedure and withstood the test
of time, is reassuring, not only to those who are criticizing discovery be-
cause of its abuses but also to those who are concerned that the abuses may
lead to measures of curtailment (or even termination) that are not basi-
cally necessary and will in the long run constitute a backward step in our
procedure.
In connection with the second, the revision of Title 8 in 1977 entailed,
as Professor Bryson points out, two notable changes in Part Four of the
Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery was expanded, under safeguards, to
three previously omitted fields: domestic relations, eminent domain, and
so-called prisoner remedies-habeas corpus and coram nobis; and statutes
relating to discovery were repealed, with the purpose of making it possible
for practitioners to consult only one resource in their use of discovery tools.
With the repeal of statutes governing depositions (except the Uniform
Foreign Depositions Act), provisions for the taking of both discovery depo-
sitions and those de bene esse have been placed in the re-written Part Four,
and rule 4:9 has been expanded to replace the statutes providing for
subpoenas duces tecum. Professor Bryson points out that the task of re-
placing all discovery statutes with Part Four has not yet been completed,
since the practitioner has to resort to statutes governing discovery in such
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areas as the State Corporation Commission, the Industrial Commission,
and certain administrative agencies. Perhaps in the additional legislation
following up the massive enactment of October 1, 1977, the job will be
completed or at least made more comprehensive than at present.
While the book will be most helpful to those engaging in discovery it does
not and was not intended to replace Part Four, which the practitioner must
always consult. For example, on page 36 the author states that if the party
* . examined pursuant to rule 4:10 takes the deposition of the examin-
ing physician, he waives thereby any physician-patient privilege;" the
rule itself limits the waiver to other examinations in respect of the same
condition; on page 41, only a partial summary is made of matters to which
the responding party has a continuing duty to supplement his responses;
on page 87, the use of depositions against a P.U.D. is limited to those taken
in the presence of his guardian ad litem or attorney, without mentioning
the use of depositions upon agreed questions. The statement is reiterated
several times (see pages 1, 30, 63-4, 110, and 119) that the scope of discov-
ery is limited to matters relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding
and which will lead to admissible evidence. This interpretation of rule
4:1(b) does not, it is believed, accord with the view of other practitioners,
although it might, if adopted, lead to a good end in the limitation of excess
discovery.
Professor Bryson's timely book should certainly serve a3 a reminder that
discovery is of ancient lineage and has been regarded as a valuable aid to
the discovery of truth and thus the proper administration of justice; and
this reminder may be as important to the Bar as the availability of an
excellent source book.
[Vol. 13:649
MINORtrrY QUOTAS iN LAW AND MEDICINE. By George H. Jaffin. 1977. pp. 55.
Reviewed by David L. Ross*
Citing Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, for the principle that "[iln the
field of moral action, truth is judged by the actual facts of life," George
H. Jaffin, Attorney Emeritus, Department of Justice, in his recent mono-
graph, Minority Quotas in Law and Medicine, applies a "facts of life"
approach to his examination of the central issues which have been pre-
sented to the United States Supreme Court in the landmark cases of
DeFunis v. Odegaard' and Bakke v. Board of Regents.2 While Jaffin's
monograph predates the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke,3 it, neverthe-
less, provides an interesting insight into the dilemma which has plagued
professional school admissions directors and administrators who have at-
tempted to develop constitutionally-sound means of ensuring that educa-
tional opportunities are available to members of minority racial and ethnic
groups while, at the same time, attempting to avoid unconstitutional in-
fringement upon rights of the majority.
The author describes his work as a study of what he terms the "double-
standard-minority-quota system," with special reference to law and medi-
cine, as a subject of constitutional test litigation. In that context, he offers
the following principal themes for discussion and analysis: The develop-
ment of constitutional rights; the technology of constitutional adjudica-
tion; the case for the ultimate goal (of a substantial increase in the number
of minority lawyers and doctors); the case for the application of double
standards and minority quotas; and, finally, the case for alternatives.
While not finding fault with the desirability of increasing the number
of minority professionals, including lawyers and doctors, the author does
suggest that the means by which academia has chosen to achieve this
"ultimate goal" warrant further reflection and analysis. Specifically, with
reference to law and medical schools, Jaffin offers the premise that the
application of double standards in the admissions process can be justified
only if the following truths are established: that the minority college grad-
uate still suffers from cultural deprivation; that the minority college gradu-
ate is prejudiced by the intrinsic cultural bias of the Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) and Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT); and, finally,
* Special Assistant Attorney General and Legal Advisor, Virginia Commonwealth Univer-
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that even if the LSAT and MCAT are not tainted by cultural bias, they
are not valid predictors of minority student performance in professional
schools. He suggests that the burden of establishing the validity of these
premises must fall upon those who promote the use of double standards.
Moving to the even more difficult problem of justifying minority quotas,
and with the observation that any such justification must pass both consti-
tutional and statistical muster, the author suggests that a much too sim-
plistic approach to minority quotas has been followed in academia, partic-
ularly when quotas have been geared to national population percentages.
By applying such quotas, the author concludes, academia has failed to
take into account factors such as the localized dimensions of professional
schools, the limitations of professional schools, the limitations upon pre-
professional manpower, and the localized value of professional opportuni-
ties and gervices.
The author concludes his study with a reflection upon the case for avail-
able alternatives "less drastic than double-standard minority quotas." Cit-
ing the voluminous and suggestive literature which identifies a wide range
of alternatives which have heretofore been explored, the author suggests
that one particularly promising alternative, predicated upon psychometric
and pedogogical experience, appears to have escaped serious consideration.
Pointing to psychometric experience, which suggests that individuals in
virtually all groups can be classified in terms of their relative standing in
the bell-shaped curve of statistical distribution or frequency, the author
observes that there are "smart, average, mediocre, and stupid individuals
in all races and ethnic groups." This, coupled with pedagogical experience,
which, according to the author, supports the hypotheses that the
"educational sifting process is almost automatic," and that despite initial
cultural deprivation, "talent should eventually assert itself at some point
in the educational process," leads the author to conclude that if latent
talent has not surfaced before the completion of college, there is less justifi-
cation for attempting the pursuit of professional or graduate education.
This latter point, the author acknowledges, is premised upon the assump-
tion that the necessary talents for post-collegiate education can be cor-
rectly identified, isolated and measured, an assumption which, the author
further acknowledges, has not gone unchallenged.
When considered, as the author states, in conjnction with the
"unavoidable fact . . .that admission requirements vary among profes-
sional schools," and, accordingly, that the schools themselves can be clas-
sified into a similar bell-shaped curve, Jaffin concludes that a viable alter-
native solution to the dilemma facing academia is to devise a matching
process to mate the individual with the appropriate school whereby "the
more talented applicants would go to the more prestigious schools; others
[Vol. 13:651
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would go to other schools." By this process, Jaffin adds, "the double-
standard-minority-quota system can be entirely eliminated."
Anticipating the objection that the net effect of his proposal would be
that few minority students would go to the prestigious schools, Jaffin sug-
gests that relatively few majority applicants presently go to the prestigious
schools and that most go elsewhere. However, and with the implicit ac-
knowledgment that his suggested alternative to double-standard-minority
quotas is not the only viable solution, Jaffin suggests that the mere availa-
bility of alternatives "opens a challenging field for further exploration."
Jaffin concludes his work with a reflection upon two general questions
which, he suggests, presented themselves at the outset of his research effort
and which serve to epitomize the epilogue to his work, namely: "Before
adopting the double-standard-minority-quota system, did academia com-
plete its homework?" and "To what extent do the facts tend to indicate
that 'cultural deprivation,' 'cultural bias,' 'parity,' etc. may be 'mere
words?'"
While Minority Quotas in Law and Medicine will serve as "food for
thought" for the interested reader, it is clear that the author's conclusions
will not be well received by many, including staunch proponents of affirm-
ative action. Nevertheless, Jaffin's work provides an interesting and
thought-provoking analysis of an issue which, the author suggests, has
become the constitutional cause celebre of the final quarter of the 20th
Century.
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